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This article argues that the doctrine of informed consent should ap-
ply to the process of adopting a child.  There is substantial evidence that 
all adopted children are at higher risk of learning disabilities and mental 
health problems than nonadopted children.  The article first summarizes 
the social science evidence demonstrating these risks and discusses some 
of the reasons why more extensive studies have not yet been done.  The 
article then turns to the law of informed consent as created and applied in 
the contexts of medicine and law, and concludes that informed consent 
doctrine should apply to the process of adoption.  Thus, adoption profes-
sionals should inform prospective adoptive parents about the risks that 
adopted children (and their parents) confront. 
 
Introduction 
Because this is an article about informed consent, I will begin 
with a disclosure.  When my husband and I adopted our beautiful infant 
son, we were confident in the belief that this process would make him our 
son in every respect.  If confronted with the maxim that Athe apple does 
not fall far from the tree,@ we would have responded that our love and 
commitment would make us the tree that would determine our son=s de-
velopment and future.  We would have been wrong.  ANeither legal papers 
nor ritualistic ceremonies change the DNA of the adopted child.  Neither 
do they cancel out his loss [of his biological family].@2 As the following 
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2article demonstrates, an adopted baby, however loved and tended, derives 
from a biological tree over which no one has any control and which no 
amount of love and effort can alter.  To paraphrase one author: all the 
nurturing in the world is Ano match for a bunch of neurotransmitters.@3
Nor should the effect of the adoption itself be minimized. 
Disproportionate percentages of adopted children have learning 
disabilities and/or mental illness, at a rate far beyond that of the non-
adopted population.  No one seems able definitively to show why this is.  
There are several possible reasons, including genetics, the trauma of the 
adoption itself, and mixtures of the two.  Choosing an explanation for 
why this is the case is beyond the scope of this article, even if there were 
an explanation available.  What matters for purposes of this article is that 
evidence of these contrasting rates of disability and mental illness exist. 
The first part of this article sets forth the existing research on 
rates of learning disabilities and mental illness in adopted children.  The 
research is sparse and often contradictory.  But it is there.  There are glar-
ing gaps, and the studies could be more voluminous, thorough, and sys-
tematic.  The article speculates as to why there is such a paucity of mate-
rials and the reasons for the clear difficulties in obtaining access to ap-
propriate study populations.  
The second part of the article sets forth the doctrine of informed 
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3consent and its implications for the adoptive process.   Adoption agen-
cies4 are of course under a legal obligation to disclose problematic infor-
mation that relates to the specific child whose adoption is under consid-
eration.  This obligation, enforced through the tort of wrongful adoption, 
is not the subject of this article.5 Rather, this article argues that general 
adoption informationBsuch as the general rates of disability and mental 
illness in adopted populationsBshould be disclosed to all prospective 
adoptive parents.  While there is some evidence that Athe vast majority of 
adoptees are well within the normal range of adjustment,@6 the risks that 
a particular child will have some form of learning disability or mental 
illness are significantly higher in adopted children than in nonadopted 
children.  It is these risks that prospective adoptive parents are entitled to 
know.  This information is distinct from the child-specific information 
that is the subject of wrongful adoption obligations and lawsuits.   In ad-
dition to any child-specific information, prospective adoptive parents 
need to know the general risks they are taking on when they adopt a 
child.   
I.  The Evidence of the Risks 
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4Before we adopted our son, it would never have occurred to us 
that adopted children were any different from biological children in any 
fundamental way.  Indeed, the agency=s efforts were dedicated to the 
proposition that adopted children are the same as nonadopted children, 
they just enter the family differently.  Our state of ignorance was destined 
not to last.  As the problems we and our son confronted spiraled into ever 
more serious and incurable realms, my husband and I started to investi-
gate special educational and residential alternatives that could address our 
son’s increasingly pronounced special needs.  When we asked what per-
centage of children--at the school for learning disabled children with con-
comitant emotional problems, or in the therapeutic boarding school for 
children with worse disabilities and more serious mental health issues--
was adopted, the answers ranged from 40 to 80 percent.  Such uniformity 
of experience eradicated any possibility of coincidence or happenstance, 
and I started to investigate whether others had undergone the same reve-
lation.  The existence of this article shows that we found we were not 
alone.  As one author points out:   
As my daughter turned fifteen, we had only one key 
left on the ring: an attorney specializing in education law, 
who could help [our adopted daughter] get into the proper 
therapeutic milieu, a residential treatment program.  He 
told us, ASo many of my clients are adopted, I don=t even 
ask anymore.@ The comment jolted meBbut also con-
firmed what I already suspected after years of noting a 
disproportionate number of adoptive parents at special 
camps and support groups, and in doctors= waiting 
rooms.7
7 Rubin, The Fallout from a Less Than Perfect Beginning, supra note 3, at 123. 
5My husband and I have spent years receiving the same information.  
If we had known what the general risks were when we adopted our out-
wardly healthy son, we might well have done it anywayBat the time I 
would have vehemently rejected and been repelled by any argument that 
nurture could not defeat nature, whatever the nature was, although I had 
not, of course, seen the data and was unaware of their existence or of the 
evidence that had caused the studies to be performed in the first place.  
Certainly I cannot now imagine life without my son.  But at least we 
would have known what we were getting into, and might have been 
spared time misspent looking for solutions that were the equivalent of 
shooting peas at an airplane.  We would have been more realistic and 
would not have suffered the death of a hope we would have known better 
than to have.  Perhaps most importantly, and as the most injurious part of 
our ignorance, we might have entered the counseling process sooner and 
headed off or at least reduced the impact of some of the issues that subse-
quently arose.  One author points out:  
Rearing an adopted child is more difficult than many adoptive 
parents would like to admit.  Many would like to believe that 
there is no difference between rearing a biological child and rear-
ing an adopted child.  This belief, although it may be well-
intended, is counterproductive.8
As time goes by, the problems can become increasingly intracta-
ble.  AWhen parents wait until adolescence to seek treatment for their 
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6children, the work can be very difficult.@9 The failure to inform parents 
of the risks they confront can be harmful in preventing parents from seek-
ing solutions sooner, problematic in the lack of postadoption services, and 
tortious to the extent that it represents an effort by adoption agencies to 
avoid the truth.  AIt is well recognized in the adoption field that adequate 
post-adoption services do not exist, yet are critical for the well-being of 
adoption triad members.@10 Refusal to confront the risks may be in part 
responsible for this dearth of services.  In any event, had we known of the 
risks involved, the total sum of sufferingBours and hisBwould in all prob-
ability have been substantially reduced.   
 Informed consent doctrine and the commitment to individual de-
cision making that it represents require that adoptive parents be informed 
of the risks that adoption brings with it, and not be left to uncover them 
on their own when the child has become a teenager.  Such information as 
there is should be disclosed.  If that leads to fewer adoptions, then so be 
it: adoptive parents should not be sacrificed on the altar of the agencies=
need to find homes for their children.   
A.  The Literature 
As I was beginning work on this article, the New York Times pub-
lished a piece that related all too closely to this topic.  The article, AThe 
 
9 Id. at 403. 
 10 Jesus Palacios and David M. Brodzinsky, Recent Changes, supra note 6 at 267.  The 
adoption triad is the child, the biological mother, and the adoptive parent(s). 
7DNA Age: That Wild Streak? Maybe It Runs in the Family@11 discussed 
the growing scientific view that many behaviorsBincluding risk-
takingBare genetic.  As one study demonstrated, a group of mice without 
the particular gene Apranced unprotected along a steel beam instead of 
huddling in safety like the other mice.@12 Such evidence of a genetic 
foundation for central behavioral differences is accumulating.  As Paul 
Rabinow, an anthropologist at the University of California, Berkeley, 
pointed out, A[m]ore and more stories about who we are and how we live 
are becoming molecular.@13
It is clear that many, and probably most, forms of mental illness 
and learning disabilities are genetically linked, if not determined.  Psy-
chobiologist Steven Pinker points out that 
Autism, dyslexia, language delay, language impair-
ment, learning disability, left-handedness, major depres-
sions, bipolar illness, obsessive-compulsive disorder, sex-
ual orientation, and many other conditions that run in 
families, are more concordant in identical than in fraternal 
twins, are better predicted by people=s biological relatives 
than by their adoptive relatives, and are poorly predicted 
by any measurable feature of the environment.14 
While this does not explain the higher incidence of mental health and 
learning issues in adopted children, it does mean that there is a biochemi-
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8cal basis for many of the problems associated with adopted children.  
With respect to these problems, the adoptive family has no chance of be-
coming the tree to its adopted children.15 Presumably any genetically 
based mental illness or learning disability would have appeared in the 
child whether adopted or not; what is unclear is why the rate of such 
problems is so much higher in adopted populations than in nonadopted 
ones. 
For various reasons that will emerge below, a substantial percent-
age of the evidence of risks of learning disabilities and mental illness in 
adopted children is anecdotal.  This does not make it any less real.  Nor 
does it mean that there is no obligation to disclose it.  There may be no 
mammoth studies, no systematic explanation of why so many adopted 
children have learning disabilities and suffer from mental illnesses.  Nev-
ertheless, prospective adoptive parents are entitled to the best evidence 
that there is.  The fact that there is no better source of information may be 
explained in any number of ways, from the privacy problems inherent in 
doing prospective studies of adopted children, to the political incorrect-
ness of the view that human behavior has an enormous biological compo-
nent, to the reluctance of adoption agencies to generate answers to ques-
tions that they would much prefer not be asked in the first place.  It is 
hard to work up any enthusiasm forBor to believe in the necessity of per-
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9formingBa study when you do not want the results.  
Nancy Newton Verrier, the parent of a daughter adopted at three 
days of age and a non-adopted daughter, began her search for the reasons 
behind her adopted daughter=s problems as a graduate student.  She re-
flects: 
According to 1985 statistics used by Parenting Re-
sources of Santa Ana, California, although adoptees at 
that time comprised 2-3% of the population of this coun-
try, they represented 30-40% of the individuals found in 
residential treatment centers, juvenile hall, and special 
schools.  They demonstrated a high incidence of juvenile 
delinquency, sexual promiscuity, and running away from 
home.  They have had more difficulty in school, both aca-
demically and socially, than their non-adopted peers.  The 
adoptees referred for treatment had relatively consistent 
symptoms, which are characterized as impulsive, provoca-
tive, aggressive, and antisocial.16 
Ms Verrier points out that prospective adoptive parents are not in-
formed that their future children, irrespective of individual family history, 
are at a much higher risk of problems than non-adopted children for rea-
sons tied to her view that A[p]roviding honest information and counseling. 
. .to adoptive parents about the special problems of being an adoptive 
family, is a conflict of interest for people making money in adoption.@17 
Perhaps a slightly less cynical view would lead to the conclusion that 
those who place children for adoption run the risk of deterring adoptions 
if they inform parents of the intractable risk of future learning and mental 
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health problems, which in itself presents a conflict of interest if one is 
dedicated to placing children for adoption.  Such conflicts, however, 
should not be resolved by withholding information that is necessary for 
the prospective parents to make an informed decision.  A doctor may be 
concerned that a patient will turn down a procedure that the doctor feels 
is necessary if the patient is informed of the risks; this is never enough to 
warrant withholding that information.18 It is the patient=s decision; so 
also it should be the parents=. AEvery potential adoptive couple needs to 
be informed about the primal wound [of adoption] and the impact it will 
have on them, their child, and their child=s biological mother.@19 
Ms Verrier thus concludes that adoption itself embodies an ine-
luctable risk factor for future serious problems.  She is far from alone in 
that view.  As another author points out:  
AIf. . . there is an increased psychosocial risk in being 
adopted, we might expect higher rates of referral to child 
psychiatric and mental health clinics for children adopted 
as babies compared to the general population of children.  
This, in fact, appears to be the case.@20 
The author believes that the stresses associated with adoption create 
their own “psychosocial risk factor” that attaches to the fact that one was 
adopted as an infant.21 Thus, even without additional risks of learning 
disabilities and mental illness, the mere fact that one is adopted itself is a 
 
18 For a further discussion about what a doctor must tell his patient, see section on 
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time bomb that is likely to go off at some point in the child=s develop-
ment.  This view has been recently corroborated in BENEATH THE MASK:
UNDERSTANDING ADOPTED TEENS.22 In the view of the authors of this 
book, adolescence is the trigger for the fact of the adoption itself to create 
chaos in the lives of the child and his or her family. 
If a therapist sees adolescent patients, it is likely 
the therapist will encounter adoptees.  In fact, about one 
third of adolescents referred for psychotherapy are 
adopted.  This finding has been confirmed in several stud-
ies.  However, only 2 percent of the general population is 
adopted.23
In the view of the authors of this book, adoption itself creates a crisis 
for the adolescent.  The book is replete with examples of adolescents re-
ferred to The Center for Adoption Support and Education (C.A.S.E.)24 for 
treatment; the adoption itself proves to be the trigger for the appearance 
of many of the problems recounted in the case histories presented. 
The authors of THE PRIMAL WOUND and BENEATH THE MASK set 
forth anecdotal evidence to support their view that adopted children have 
many more learning and mental health problems than nonadopted chil-
dren.  Their view is that the fact of the adoption in itself constitutes an 
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overwhelming risk factor for the problems encountered by many adopted 
children.  This view is not necessarily consistent with the current scien-
tific discoveries surrounding the genetic basis for most forms of learning 
and mental health problems, although certainly the adoption could itself 
make genetic tendencies more likely to manifest themselves.  But is it the 
case that adopted children do in fact have more problems than 
nonadopted children? The systematic generation of statistical evidence 
that adopted children in fact have more problems than nonadopted chil-
dren has been hampered by a dearth of reliable and scientific studies.  
There are, however, some scientific studies, and there is at least some 
evidence that adopted children have many more learning and mental 
problems than nonadopted children. 
Perhaps the largest study that compared 1587 adopted children 
and 87,165 nonadopted children through school surveys concluded that 
Aadopted adolescents are at higher risk in all of the domains examined, 
including school achievement and problems, substance use, psychological 
well-being, physical health, fighting, and lying to parents.@25 The study 
further concluded that Amore adopted adolescents have problems of vari-
ous kinds than their nonadopted peers [and that] . . . comparisons of dis-
tributions suggest much larger proportions of adopted than nonadopted 
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 25 Brent C. Miller et al., Comparisons of Adopted and Nonadopted Adolescents in a 
Large, Nationally Representative Sample, 71 CHILD DEVELOPMENT 1458, 1458 (2000) (here-
inafter Miller Study).  
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adolescents at the extremes of salient outcome variables.@26 
In its literature review, the Miller Study pointed out that:  
Some research indicates that adopted adolescents 
have higher levels of psychological and behavior prob-
lems than nonadoptees.  Early studies documented that 
adopted children are several times more likely than their 
nonadopted peers to be referred for psychological treat-
ment, and some investigators have concluded that 
adoptees are especially likely to display higher levels of 
externalizing behaviors and learning disabilities, includ-
ing attention deficit disorder.27 
There are, of course, opposing viewpoints, but many of them 
seem limited to challenging the methodologies of the existing studies and 
to providing explanations for and recalculating the results of these studies 
that are inconsistent with the conclusion that adopted children in fact 
have more problems than nonadopted children.  An example of this latter 
approach is the statement in 1989 by the National Council for Adoption 
to the effect that Aadopted children are overrepresented in psychotherapy 
and residential treatment because adoptive parents are used to dealing 
with agencies and seeking professional help.@28 A study of 72 adopted 
children, with only 30 over age 12, reported Afew or no significant differ-
ences between adopted and nonadopted children.@29 Adopted children are 
more likely than nonadopted children Ato be referred for mental health 
treatment. . . .Adoptive parents also have higher than average incomes 
and education, thus having the resources to seek help for even normal 
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 27 Id. at 1458. 
 28 Id. 
14 
developmental problems.@30 One study summarized evidence that the 
higher number of adopted children Ain psychiatric populations is partially 
due to referral bias@ but also concluded that Aadopted children are particu-
larly prone to externalizing disorders, and that a complex blend of ge-
netic, as well as pre-, peri-, and postnatal environmental factors contrib-
ute to the manifestation of these disorders.@31
The Miller Study summarized the existing studies as follows: 
Athere is a consensus that adopted children are overrepresented in psycho-
logical therapy and residential treatment programs.  This could be be-
cause more adopted children have problems, because adoptive parents are 
more likely to take adopted children for treatment, or both.@32 One of the 
goals for the Miller Study was to compare adopted and nonadopted ado-
lescents in a large and nationally representative sample, which was ac-
complished by including 1587 adopted children and 87,165 nonadopted 
children.   
While a detailed summary of this study is beyond the scope of 
this article, some of the conclusions are worth stressing.  The results sug-
gested Aa generalized adoption effect that tends to be more negative for 
boys than for girls.@33 The proportion of adoptees grows as one ap-
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proaches the extreme ends of problematic behavior: AA larger proportion 
of adoptees than nonadoptees is near the negative end of outcome vari-
ables; and the closer to the negative end of an outcome variable distribu-
tion, the larger the proportional difference is between adoptees and 
nonadoptees.@34
Practically, how meaningful are these 
adoptee/nonadoptee differences in proportions at the ex-
treme tails of outcome variable distributions?  In many 
psychological or educational assessment situations, indi-
viduals who score in the extreme distribution tails (low 
end of positive variables or high end of negative vari-
ables) would be candidates for treatment or intervention. . 
. .Ratios of adoptee to nonadoptee proportions near these 
extreme lower distribution tails are 2:1, 3:1, or even larger 
in the present analyses. . . 35 
The findings in the Miller Study Adocument that adoptees have more 
problems than their peers, and the results are remarkably consistent 
across the positive and negative outcome variables examined.@36 Con-
cerned about the negative implications for adoption that the study clearly 
adumbrates, the authors state: 
An implication of these findings is not that adoption 
should be discouraged or that adoption is bad for children.  
Adoption is probably very good, considering the alterna-
tives, for children who are otherwise faced with prolonged 
foster care or remaining with biological parents who are 
unable or unwilling to care for them.  In this sense, adop-
tion is usually a positive solution to difficult circum-
stances.  One implication, however of acknowledging that 
adoptees have more problems than nonadoptees . . . might 
 
racial variables, Ain-racially adopted Caucasian males were found to have the worst out-
comes of adoptees overall.@). 




be that adoption policy and practices could be revised to 
provide adoptive families with more long-term support.  
Adoptive parents also could be more fully informed about 
the elevated problems of some adopted children and their 
families.37 
The authors conclude with a call for further research: 
The second major limitation of these analyses38 is 
that they do not help explain why, as a group, adopted 
adolescents have more problems.  Our results demon-
strate, quite convincingly, that adopted adolescents= be-
havior and functioning are more problematic than the be-
havior and functioning of their nonadopted peers, but 
why? . . . . [F]uture analyses are likely to reveal that ge-
netic factors and early experiences form a complex mix-
ture of primary causal mechanisms.39 
Unfortunately, the studies sought by the authors of this report seem 
not to have been performed, and there are no scientific explanations of 
why adopted children have more problems than nonadopted ones.  Nor 
are there studies of rates of mental illness in adult adopted populations as 
compared with nonadopted populations, which would perhaps be the 
logical corollary for the Miller Study.  Many forms of major mental ill-
ness do not appear in their victims until young adulthood, an age group 
that the Miller Study did not include.   
 
37 Id. It is perhaps worth noting here that children of lower socioeconomic status who 
are adopted as infants by parents of higher socioeconomic status score 10 to 20 points 
higher on IQ tests than their biological parents, although their IQ scores are lower than 
those of their adoptive parents.  They also score 10-20 points higher than their biological 
siblings who remained with their biological families.  See HOWE, supra note 21, at 31-32.   
 38 Miller Study at 1472.  The first was that the study did not control for the age of the 
adopted child at placement.   
 39 Id. In a subsequent article, Dr. Miller discussed in detail some of the methodologi-
cal challenges in studying adoption using large scale population-based studies.  Brent C. 
Miller et al., Methodological Issues in Using Large-Scale Survey Data for Adoption Re-
search, PSYCHOLOGICAL ISSUES IN ADOPTION: RESEARCH AND PRACTICE 233, 246 (David M. 
Brodzinsky & Jesus Palacios, eds. Praeger Publishers 2005).  These were problems not 
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A recent study40 challenged the methodological technique of compar-
ing adopted and nonadopted children, arguing that comparing adopted 
children to nonadopted children is an inherently unequal comparison.41 
The research for this study was performed in Andalusia, Spain.  The au-
thors point out that the comparison depends on whether non-clinical or 
clinical populations are used: 
The former studies [clinical samples] tend to present 
an image of greater problems and maladjustments in 
adopted children than in nonadopted children, with a 
higher incidence of learning and behavioral problems.  
The latter studies [nonclinical samples] tend to give a less 
dramatic view of the difference, but they still show 
adopted children to be a more problematic group than 
nonadopted children.42 
In discussing parental responses to their adopted children, the 
study indicates that A[p]roblems related to hyperactivity are those that 
stand out among the concerns of adoptive parents, and this seems per-
fectly consistent with the greater incidence of this problem in these chil-
dren . . . @43 Interestingly, parents with children over 16 years of age per-
ceived more difference Ain the nature of adoptive family life than parents 
[with children between 7 and 11 years old].@44 The authors conclude: 
The second implication of our first section deals with 
 
shared by the Miller Study data collection techniques. 
 40 Jesus Palacios & Yolanda Sanchez-Sandoval, Beyond Adopted/Nonadopted Com-
parisons in PSYCHOLOGICAL ISSUES IN ADOPTION: RESEARCH AND PRACTICE 117-144 (David 
M. Brodzinsky & Jesus Palacios, eds. Praeger Publishers 2005). 
 41 Why this is the case is unexplained, unless the assumption is being made that 
adopted children are different in some way. 
 42 Palacios & Sanchez-Sandoval, supra note 41, at 118-119. 
 43 Id. at 131. 
 44 Id. at 134.  This supports the view that adolescence is a particularly traumatic time 
for adopted children, over and above the normal problems that adolescence brings. 
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the Alove is not enough@ message.  If there was a time 
when idealistic views were held about adoption as a solu-
tion for all problems of the adoptees. . . that time is now 
over.  No doubt, there are many crucial problems and 
emotional wounds that love can heal, and this is also true 
for adoption.  But in order to deal with their children=s
behavior problems, chronic illnesses, special needs, hy-
peractivity, impulsivity, school difficulties, feelings of 
loss, and so on, adoptive parents very often need advice 
and support, and the adoptees may also need . . . specific 
professional support . . . .Our postadoption services 
should be more sophisticated and more readily available 
for those who need them, both parents and children.45
The study concludes with a call for researchers to put their results in a 
form that can be readily disseminated to and understood by those who 
need it.46 
Adopted children, particularly boys, seem at much higher risk for 
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder than nonadopted children.   
[I]n fact, if statistics from specific diagnostic sub-
groups within clinic populations are extrapolated to the 
general population of adopted children and adolescents, 
the results are startling, indeed.  Extrapolating from the 
findings . . . for example, suggests that 23 percent of 
adopted children (36 percent of boys and 14 percent of 
girls) would be expected to have ADHD.  This figure is 
several times greater than the rate of ADHD in the general 
population, which is generally estimated to be between 3 
and 5 percent47.
While it is possible that adopted children are more frequently diag-
nosed with learning or mental health problems because of a Arelatively 
low threshold for psychiatric referral [among adoptive parents,@
45 Id. at 141-42. 
 46 Id. at 142. 
 47 Barbara D. Ingersoll, Psychiatric Disorders Among Adopted Children: A Review and 
Commentary, 1 ADOPTION QUARTERLY 57, 58 (1997). 
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[M]ost of the available evidence indicates that 
adopted children come to professional attention at higher-
than-expected rates in part because: (a) they manifest a 
higher incidence of psychiatric problems than do non-
adopted children; and, (b) their problems are mainly of 
the externalizing kind, which adults find annoying and 
aversive.48 
There are studies that conclude that there are few differences be-
tween adopted and nonadopted children, or that reject the inferences from 
existing studies that lead to the conclusion that there are such differences.  
One such study points out that existing literature disagrees as to the ex-
tent to which adopted children are in fact over-represented clinical popu-
lations, and rejects any conclusions on the grounds that these inconsisten-
cies themselves make it impossible to draw any.49 This study points out 
that there are barriers to performing reliable studies, including confidenti-
ality concerns, the absence of reporting requirements, and the low rate of 
adoption, all of which combine to foil efforts to perform any studies from 
which reliable conclusions may be drawn.50 Even this study, however, 
notes that the Adifferences found between adopted and nonadopted chil-
dren in terms of emotional and behavior problems are statistically signifi-
cant . . . @51 
Another study noted that  
[A]dopted youth were more likely to show ASB [anti-
 
48 Id. at 62. 
 49 Ann E. Brand and Paul M. Brinich, Behavior Problems and Mental Health Contacts 
in Adopted, Foster, and Nonadopted Children, 40 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. PSYCHIATRY. 1221, 
1222 (1999). 
 50 Id. at 1222. 
 51 Id. at 1226. 
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social behavior], but the effect was not statistically sig-
nificant. . . .When the adoption status x gender interaction 
term was added for NAASB [non-aggressive antisocial 
behavior] . . . the interaction effect was significant, as was 
the adoption status effect.  However, the additional vari-
ance explained on this last step was only .2 percentage 
points.52 
This study stated that adoption itself is not the sole source of the be-
havioral problems that many adoptees exhibit, but challenged its own data 
and encouraged the availability of postadoption services Atailored to the 
needs of adoptees [and their families].@53 
B.  The Paucity of Literature 
While some work on the effects of adoption and risks in adopted 
populations has been done, more work is needed.  Considering the num-
bers of adopted children in our society and the rate at which problems 
arise, it is perhaps surprising that more studies have not appeared on the 
subject and that the existing studies are so limited in research popula-
tions.   Older populations need to be studied, for example.  Many major 
mental illnesses manifest themselves in young adults, which mean that 
studies of young children will not reveal information about their mental 
health as adults.  Larger populations need to be studied, as well.  If be-
tween two and three percent of the population in the United States is 
adopted, it is concomitantly clear that there are many adopted persons and 
adoptive families that have not been found or studied. 
 
52 Harold D. Grotevant et al., Antisocial Behavior of Adoptees and Nonadoptees: Pre-
diction from Early History and Adolescent Relationships, 16 JOURNAL OF RESEARCH ON 
ADOLESCENCE 105, 126 (2006). 
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The logical sources of statistical information for further study 
would be adoption agencies.  Thus far, their participation in generating 
data has been minimal at most.  There are, as suggested above, several 
possible reasons for what looks like reluctance on their part.  First, and 
the least problematic, the agencies might be concerned about the privacy 
of their families.  This objection is so readily solved as to render it disin-
genuous.   There would clearly be privacy issues if agencies, without 
prior consent, supplied identities of adoptive families to scientists seeking 
to perform statistical analyses on the status of the adopted individuals.  
These issues could readily be eliminated by one of several techniques.  
First, families could be asked to consent to participation in studies.  In all 
honesty, we would have refused to participate in such a studyBbut then, 
we had not been informed of the risks of adopting a child in the first 
place.  Had we been so informed, and had we proceeded with the adop-
tion, we might well have agreed to participate in studies of adoption, par-
ticularly if what turned out to be needed services were provided as part of 
the study.54 
Another way to eliminate privacy concerns lies in anonymity.  
The surveys could be given to the agency, and the agency could send 
them to the participants.   Upon their return to the agency, the agency 
could supply the completed surveys to the scientists, making sure that all 
 
53 Id. at 128.   
 54 Our adoption agency provided no follow-up services of any kind beyond the first 
couple of years. 
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identifying information was first removed.  The scientists would, of 
course, pay the costs of this agency work.  Those families willing to be 
identified to the surveyors could also be located through this process. 
Second, agencies might be unwilling to provide the support ser-
vices that the surveys might themselves suggest were necessary.  Many of 
the studies discussed above call for enhanced postadoption services; it is 
possible that more studies would suggest the need for more services as a 
general matter.  The surveys would moreover disclose to the agency that a 
particular family was struggling in some way.  Thus, the surveys them-
selves might reveal a need for support services in particular cases even if 
not more generally, and the agencies might be obligated to provide them.  
This would be expensive, and might lead to disruptions in the relation-
ships between the agencies and their clients.   
Third, and most problematic, the agencies might not want the an-
swers that the study might generate.  Once it is scientifically and inargua-
bly proven that adopted children suffer from a higher rate of problems as 
children and a higher rate of mental illness as adults, as most of the evi-
dence currently available seems to suggest, the case for nondisclosure of 
such risks would dissipate.  It would be impossible to contend that the 
studies were equivocal or that there is little to no evidence that adopted 
children are any different from any other children and to rely on this con-
tention to support nondisclosure.  Clearly, such answers would necessi-
tate changes in the adoption world.   
In any event, the literature is what it is.  At the least, it confirms 
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the impressions of adoptive parents that adopted children have more 
problems than nonadopted children.  Knowledge of such literature 
canBand did, in my caseBprovide a sense of community (if only after the 
fact) with other adoptive parents.  Agencies cannot be ignorant of the 
literature, but do not disclose the information in it to prospective parents.  
There are risks that prospective adoptive parents would want and need to 
know about in their own decision-making process.  Such knowledge 
might deter adoptions, a result that would be anathema to adoption agen-
cies for both financial and humanitarian reasons.  But, as the next section 
discusses, the decision is not the agencies= to make.  They should be re-
quired by the law of informed consent to provide such information to 
couples and individuals seeking adoption. 
II.  Informed Consent in General 
The doctrine of informed consent developed in the medical arena.  
The doctrine centers on the view that all persons are autonomous and 
therefore endowed with the right to make their own decisions about their 
own bodies.  It requires that doctors disclose to their patients all risks 
inherent in a proposed treatment which are sufficiently material55 such 
that a reasonable patient would take them into account in deciding 
 
55 Harbeson v. Parke Davis, Inc., 746 F.2d 517, 522 (9th Cir. 1984) (stating health care 
providers must provide individuals with any material information necessary to make intel-
ligent decisions); Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 786-87 (D.C.Cir. 1972) (“The test for 
determining whether a particular peril must be divulged is its materiality to the patient’s 
decision: all risks potentially affecting the decision must be unmasked”), cert. denied, 409 
U.S. 1064 (1972); Smith v. Shannon, 666 P.2d 351, 354 (Wash. 1983) (“A necessary corollary 
to this principle is that the individual be given sufficient information to make an intelligent 
decision.”) 
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whether to undergo treatment.56 This disclosure must encompass both the 
significant general risks of a particular procedure or course of treatment 
in addition to the risks unique for that particular patient.57 This required 
disclosure, enforced through tort law and statute, is based on the funda-
mental principle that people are entitled to make decisions about their 
own medical treatment.58
Exceptions to the duty to disclose are limited.  Doctors are ex-
cused from obtaining consent from patients who are unconscious, incom-
petent or in need of emergency care.59 The doctrine of informed consent 
also does not require doctors to disclose risks that are unknown,60 com-
monly understood to be inherent in a particular procedure, or those that 
 
56 See Petty v. United States, 740 F.2d 1428, 1436 (8th Cir. 1984) (noting informed 
consent under patient rule standard requires that “individual[s] . . . be advised of the inher-
ent and potential hazards of the proposed treatment, any alternative methods of treatment, 
the risks attendant to such alternatives, and the likely results of remaining untreated.”); 
Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 10 (Cal. 1972) (stating there is duty to disclose other “available 
choices with respect to proposed therapy and of the dangers inherently and potentially 
involved in each.”).  See also Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d at 787-788 (“The topics impor-
tantly demanding a communication of information are the inherent and potential hazards of 
the proposed treatment, the alternatives to that treatment, if any, and the results likely if 
the patient remains untreated); Cowman v. Hornaday, 329 N.W.2d 422, 425 (Iowa 1983) 
(stating the “duty to disclose has been held to include information relating to the nature of 
the ailment, the nature of the proposed treatment, the probability of success of the contem-
plated therapy and its alternatives, and the risk of unfortunate consequences associated 
with such treatment); Jaskoviak v. Gruver, 638 N.W.2d 1, 7 (N.D. 2002) (noting that since 
Canterbury v. Spence, courts have “tended to favor a duty to disclose all material informa-
tion, that is, information the physician can reasonably expect a patient would want to con-
sider in determining whether to undergo the medical procedure.”). 
 57 See Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d at 10 (noting doctors owe patients duty of reasonable 
disclosure of potential risks inherent in a treatment).    
 58 Id. (noting doctors bound by duty to disclose other alternative treatments and dan-
gers involved in each). See also Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 105 N.E. 92, 
93 (N.Y. 1914). 
 59 E.g. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d at 788-89 (D.C.Cir. 1972) (noting emergency 
situations are exception to rule of disclosure), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Shine v. 
Vega, 709 N.E.2d 58, 64 n. 15 (Mass. 1998) (citing unconsciousness as one emergency excep-
tion that excuses doctors from obtaining informed consent of patient); Cross v. Trapp, 294 
S.E.2d 446, 455 n. 6 (W.Va. 1982) (noting doctors must be free to exercise best medical 
judgment when treating life-threatening injury due to emergency). 
 60 Shadrick v. Coker, 963 S.W.2d 726, 733 (Tenn. 1998) (stating doctors not required to 
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are already known by the patient. 61 Another exception to informed con-
sent arises when fully disclosing the risks to a patient is considered medi-
cally inadvisable,62 such as where the disclosure will result in a harmful 
physical, emotional or psychological effect on the patient which would 
outweigh any benefit to fully informing that patient.63 The risk that a 
fully informed patient will decline treatment that the doctor believes nec-
essary is not enough, by itself, to warrant nondisclosure.64 
In some jurisdictions, the standard of what a doctor must disclose 
is governed by a reasonable patient standard.  This means that doctors 
must provide enough information to satisfy what a reasonable patient 
would want to know under the circumstances.65 While there is some de-
 
disclose every possible risk of treatment, only those that are known and likely). 
 61 Id. (noting “health care providers are generally not required to disclose risks that 
are not material, such as those that are extremely unlikely to occur or one that a reasonable 
patient would not care to know due to its insignificance [or] . . . risks that are obvious or 
already known by the patient. . .”); see also Calwell v. Hassan, 925 P.2d 422, 432 (Kan. 
1996) (stating doctors need not warn patients about risks which patients already know 
about).   
 62 See Crain v. Allison, 443 A.2d 558, 563 (D.C. 1982) (stating doctor is excused from 
obtaining informed consent when disclosing information will threaten patient=s well-being); 
Woods v. Brumlop, 377 P.2d 520, 525 (N.M. 1962) (A[A]nother exception is where an expla-
nation of every risk attendant upon a treatment procedure may well result in alarming a 
patient. . . [and] such [a] disclosure may result in actually increasing the risk by reason of 
the psychological results of the apprehension itself). 
 63 Shadrick v. Coker, 963 S.W.2d at 733 (holding full disclosure not necessary when 
nformation would make patient unduly alarmed and “jeopardize his physical or emotional 
well-being.”).   
 64 Canterbury v. Spence, F.2d at 789 (“The physician’s privilege to withhold informa-
tion for therapeutic reasons must be carefully circumscribed . . . [and the law] does not 
accept the paternalistic notion that the physician may remain silent simply because divul-
gence might prompt the patient to forego therapy the physician feels the patient really 
needs.”). 
 65 Wheeldon v. Madison, 374 N.W.2d 367, 374 (S.D. 1985) (stating “an increasing 
number of courts have rejected the [former] majority rule, opting instead in a favor of a 
patient-oriented standard.”). Accord, Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d at 786-87 (“[T]he pa-
tient’s right of self-decision shapes the boundaries of the duty to reveal.”); Crain v. Allison,
443 A.2d at 562 (“The test for mandatory disclosure of information on treatment of the 
patient’s condition is whether a reasonable person in what the physician knows or should 
know to be the patient’s position would consider the information material to his decision.”); 
Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 10 (Cal. 1972) (“Unlimited discretion in the physician is irrecon-
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bate over whether the disclosure should be measured by what a reason-
able doctor would disclose or what a reasonable patient needs to know,66 
these standards tend to merge because a reasonable doctor should disclose 
what a reasonable patient needs to know.  The doctor is always, of course, 
held to the standard of knowledge of a reasonable doctor in the circum-
stances in terms of factual knowledge of the risks.  In other words, a doc-
tor is not obligated to disclose a risk about which a reasonable doctor 
would not know. 
As well as by tort law, doctors are guided by a professional code 
of ethics that mandates what they must disclose to their patients and gov-
erns the doctor-patient relationship.67 The doctrine of informed consent 
is designed to give patients greater autonomy over decisions that affect 
their lives and to allow them to fully participate in their health care deci-
sions by ensuring they have all the pertinent information when making 
vital decisions.68 In addition to their informed consent obligations, doc-
 
cilable with the basic right of the patient to make the ultimate informed decision regarding 
the course of treatment to which he knowledgably consents to be subjected.”); Logan v. 
Greenwich Hosp. Ass=n, 465 A.2d 294 (Conn. 1983) (discussing shift after Canterbury v. 
Spence away from professional standard to that of patient oriented standard of disclosure, 
or what reasonable patient would want to know under the circumstances.) See also In-
formed Consent, American Medical Association: Helping Doctors Help Patients, available at 
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/4608.html (discussing informed consent from 
perspective of what doctor must tell patient).   
 66 Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d at 786 (“some [courts] have measured the disclosure 
by ‘good medical practice,’ others by what a reasonable practitioner would have bared under 
the circumstances. . . . [But] [a]ny definition of scope in terms purely of a professional stan-
dard is at odds with the patient’s prerogative to decide on projected himself.”).  The court 
further noted that “[t]he scope of the physician’s communications to the patient, then, must 
be measured by the patient’s need, and that need is the information material to the deci-
sion.” Id. (internal citations omitted).  
 67 See Code of Medical Ethics, available at http://www.ama-
assn.org/apps/pf_new/pf_online?category=CEJA&assn=AMA&f_n=mSearch&s_t=&st_p=&n
th=1& (discussing guidelines of disclosure required by doctors).  
 68 See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d at 780 (AThe root premise is the concept, funda-
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tors have a fiduciary obligation to their patients to avoid conflicts of in-
terest that might affect their judgment.69 As with all professions, if the 
doctor does not treat the patient, it affects his or her fee: a surgeon does 
not get paid for not operating, for example, just as an attorney does not 
get paid for not suing someone.  All professionals who face this form of 
conflict of interest are equally obligated to put the welfare of their cli-
ents/patients first, ahead of their own.70 
Other types of professionals, such as lawyers and certain financial 
industry professionals, are also subject to specific Ainformed consent@-like 
responsibilities, although that responsibility might be better characterized 
as a duty to disclose material information necessary for informed decision 
making.  Securities brokers, for example, function as fiduciaries to their 
clients and are therefore in a position of trust and confidence.71 When a 
 
mental in American jurisprudence, that >[e]very human being of adult years and sound 
mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body. . .@) (quoting Schloen-
dorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914); Smith v. Shannon, 666 
P.2d 351, 354 (Wash. 1983) (noting informed consent doctrine is premised on fundamental 
principle that competent individual is entitled to determine what shall be done to his or her 
own body). 
69 Moore v. Regents of University of California, 271 Cal.Rptr. 146, 154 (Cal. 1990) 
(holding that where doctor was performing procedure on patient that was of  research and 
economic value to him, doctor had duty to disclose the research and economic value to pa-
tient, because “the existence of a motivation for a medical procedure unrelated to the pa-
tient's health is a potential conflict of interest and a fact material to the patient's deci-
sion.”). 
70 HMOs are somewhat cynically designed to deter treatment by making it in doctors=
financial self interest not to treat.  See Barry Furrow, et al., LIABILITY AND QUALITY 
ISSUES IN HEALTH CARE 520 (Thomson/West 2004). 
 71 See Sexton v. Kelly, 200 P.2d 950, 954 (Or. 1948) (stating broker, as agent for prin-
cipal “occupied a fiduciary relation[ship] and was required to act with the utmost good faith 
and loyalty in her interest, and . . . [he had affirmative duty to communicate] to her all 
material information to her advantage which. . . he possess[ed]. . .”); Gillmore v. Morelli, 
472 N.W.2d 738, 739 (N.D. 1991) (holding a “broker's duty to an employer is essentially the 
same fiduciary duty that an agent owes to a principal.”); Sigurdson v. Lahr & Lahr, Inc., 
299 N.W.2d 792, 796 (N.D., 1980) (stating broker is under legal obligation to disclose mate-
rial facts which might affect his principal's interests).  See also 12 C.J.S. Brokers '41 (2006); 
 
28 
fiduciary relationship exists between a professional and his or her client, 
the professional is obligated to disclose material information to that client 
which the fiduciary possesses and the client is entitled to know.72 It is the 
fiduciary nature of the relationship that creates the obligation of disclo-
sure.  When the law imposes a duty on one party to disclose all material 
facts known to that party and not known to the other, silence or conceal-
ment in violation of this duty coupled with the intent to deceive the other 
party amounts to fraud.73 
Real estate agents and brokers are also generally required to dis-
close material information to their clients.  Generally speaking, a real 
estate agent's or a broker's liability to his or her client is founded on the 
law of agency.74 Brokers, as agents, ordinarily owe a fiduciary duty to 
their principals.75 Among a broker=s duties are the obligations to account 
 
8 AM.JUR. Brokers '86 (2006). 
 72 United States v. Szur, 289 F.3d 200, 210 (2d Cir. 2002) (A[A] fiduciary owes a duty of 
honest services to his customer, including a duty to disclose all material facts concerning 
the transaction entrusted to it.@) (quoting United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 565 
(citing Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980)).      
 73 See e.g., Wheeler v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 42 S.W.2d 579, 583 (Mo. 1931) ("Where the 
law, by reason of the relation of the parties . . . or other circumstances, imposes a duty upon 
one of them to disclose all material facts known to him and not known to the other, mere 
silence in violation of this duty, with intent to deceive, will amount to fraud."); Perkins v. 
Marsh, 37 P.2d 689, 690 (Wash. 1934) (stating concealment by one party of material fact 
which he is bound to disclose is actual fraud).   
 74 See Proctor v. Holden, 540 A.2d 133, 141 (Md. App. 1988) (stating broker=s liability 
is founded on law of agency).  Agency is defined as ". . . the fiduciary relation which results 
from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his 
behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act.@ Restatement (Second) 
of Agency '1 (1958).  AThree elements are integral to any agency relationship: (1) the agent 
is subject to the principal's right of control; (2) the agent has a duty to act primarily for the 
benefit of the principal; and (3) the agent holds a power to alter the legal relations of the 
principal.@ Id. at  ''12-14 (1958).     
 75 Proctor v. Holden, 540 A.2d 133, 141 (Md. App. 1988) (noting broker, as agent for 
principal, owes fiduciary duty of “diligence, care, loyalty, disclosure and the like.”). 
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for all funds or property that belong to the principal76 and to refrain from 
acting in any way that is adverse to the principal's interests or done solely 
to advance the broker=s own personal interests.77 A broker must not en-
gage in fraudulent conduct toward his or her principal.78 More specifi-
cally, a broker has an affirmative duty to make a full and frank disclosure 
of any information he or she possesses that may be to the principal's ad-
vantage.79 Real estate brokers, too, generally act as fiduciaries to their 
principals80 and must therefore act with Afidelity and good faith@81 and in 
the best interests of their principals.82 Real estate agents are under a both 
a legal and moral obligation to faithfully serve their clients.83
Lawyers, too, like doctors, brokers, real estate agents and other 
financial professionals, also have special obligations to their clients and 
have guidelines that govern those responsibilities.84 The attorney-client 
 
76 See 12 AM. JUR. 2D Brokers '113 (2006); Restatement (Second) of Agency '382 
(1958). 
 77 See 12 AM. JUR. 2D Brokers '111 (2006). 
 78 See Id. at '114. 
 79 See Id. at '116. 
 80 Garren v. First Realty, Ltd., 481 N.W.2d 335, 337 (Iowa 1992) (stating real estate 
brokers are fiduciaries to principals).   
 81 Garren v. First Realty, Ltd., 481 N.W.2d at 337 (noting fiduciary relationship man-
dates trust and loyalty between fiduciary and principal). 
 82 Sonnenschein v. Douglas Elliman-Gibbson & Ives, 753 N.E.2d 857, 860 (N.Y. 2001) 
("[A] real estate broker is a fiduciary with a duty of loyalty and an obligation to act in the 
best interests of the principal.") (quoting Dubbs v. Stribling & Assocs., 752 N.E.2d 850, 852 
(N.Y. 2001).  
 83 Darby v. Furman Co., Inc., 513 S.E.2d 848, 849 (S.C. 1999) (noting fiduciary rela-
tionship imposes “a high moral duty to give loyal service to the principal.”).  The court fur-
ther held that “the duty of an agent to make full disclosure to his principal of all material 
facts relevant to the agency is fundamental to the fiduciary relationship of principal and 
agent.”  Id. at 850. 
 84 See American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rules of Professional Conduct, available 
at https://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/model_rules.html. In 1983, the ABA adopted the Model Rules 
of Professional Conduct. See PREFACE, MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2006), available 
at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/preface.html. Since the ABA is a private organization, 
its ethics rules generally do not have the force of law, so the Rules have no legal effect 
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relationship creates a fiduciary duty, and attorneys have one of the Ahigh-
est fiduciary duties imposed by law.@85 Attorneys are required to Adeal 
fairly, honestly and with undivided loyalty@ to their clients.86 The nature 
of the attorney-client relationship is such that attorneys are responsible 
for A. . . operating competently, safeguarding client property and honoring 
the client=s interests over the lawyer=s.@87 Lawyers must also maintain the 
confidential information of their clients88 and must avoid conflicts of in-
terest.89 A lawyer has in a conflict of interest when Aon behalf of one 
 
unless they are affirmatively adopted by the controlling jurisdiction.   See PREAMBLE AND 
SCOPE, MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2006), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/preamble.html. However, since many state bar associa-
tions and state courts have adopted the Rules, they do have considerable force, and in cases 
where they have not been adopted, courts can still use them to guide their decisions.  Id. 
85 In re Hayes, 183 F.3d 162, 168 (2d. Cir. 1999) (A. . . the attorney-client relationship 
entails one of the highest fiduciary duties imposed by law.@). 
 86 In re Cooperman, 633 N.E.2d 1069, 1071 (N.Y. 1994) ("This unique fiduciary reli-
ance ... is imbued with ultimate trust and confidence."). 
 
87 In re Cooperman, 633 N.E.2d 1069, 1071 (N.Y. 1914)  
 88 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2006), available at 
https://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/rule_1_6.html.  The full text of the rule reads: 
a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the 
client gives informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out 
the representation or the disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b). 
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client to the extent 
the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: 
(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm; 
(2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to 
result in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another and in further-
ance of which the client has used or is using the lawyer's services; 
(3) to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial interests or property of 
another that is reasonably certain to result or has resulted from the client's commission of a 
crime or fraud in furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer's services; 
(4) to secure legal advice about the lawyer's compliance with these Rules; 
(5) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the law-
yer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the law-
yer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any 
proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the client; or 
(6) to comply with other law or a court order. 
Id. 
 89 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7, available at 
https://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/rule_1_7.html. The full text of the rule reads:   
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent a client if the 
representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of in-
terest exists if: 
 
31 
client, it is his duty to contend for that which his duty to another client 
requires him to oppose.@90 The attorney-client relationship is so highly 
 
(1) the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client; or 
(2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will 
be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former 
client or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer. 
(b) Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest under para-
graph (a), a lawyer may represent a client if: 
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide com-
petent and diligent representation to each affected client; 
(2) the representation is not prohibited by law; 
(3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client 
against another client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or other 
proceeding before a tribunal; and 
(4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing. 
Id. 
 90 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8, available at 
https://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/rule_1_8.html. The full text of the rule reads: 
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly 
acquire an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest adverse to a 
client unless: 
(1) the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest are fair 
and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in writing 
in a manner that can be reasonably understood by the client; 
(2) the client is advised in writing of the desirability of seeking and is given a 
reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent legal counsel on the 
transaction; and 
(3) the client gives informed consent, in a writing signed by the client, to the es-
sential terms of the transaction and the lawyer's role in the transaction, includ-
ing whether the lawyer is representing the client in the transaction. 
(b) A lawyer shall not use information relating to representation of a client to the 
disadvantage of the client unless the client gives informed consent, except as per-
mitted or required by these Rules. 
(c) A lawyer shall not solicit any substantial gift from a client, including a testamen-
tary gift, or prepare on behalf of a client an instrument giving the lawyer or a per-
son related to the lawyer any substantial gift unless the lawyer or other recipient of 
the gift is related to the client. For purposes of this paragraph, related persons in-
clude a spouse, child, grandchild, parent, grandparent or other relative or individual 
with whom the lawyer or the client maintains a close, familial relationship. 
(d) Prior to the conclusion of representation of a client, a lawyer shall not make or 
negotiate an agreement giving the lawyer literary or media rights to a portrayal or 
account based in substantial part on information relating to the representation. 
(e) A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in connection with 
pending or contemplated litigation, except that: 
(1) a lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation, the repayment 
of which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter; and 
(2) a lawyer representing an indigent client may pay court costs and expenses of 
litigation on behalf of the client. 
(f) A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client from one other 
than the client unless: 
(1) the client gives informed consent; 
(2) there is no interference with the lawyer's independence of professional 
judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship; and 




valued that the United States Supreme Court has said: 
There are few of the business relations of life involv-
ing a higher trust and confidence than those of attorney 
and client or, generally speaking, one more honorably and 
faithfully discharged; few more anxiously guarded by the 
law, or governed by sterner principles of morality and jus-
tice; and it is the duty of the court to administer them in a 
corresponding spirit, and to be watchful and industrious, 
to see that confidence thus reposed shall not be used to 
the detriment or prejudice of the rights of the party be-
stowing it.91 
This article now turns to the lessons that this body of law can teach to 
adoption agencies.  Prospective adoptive parents approach agencies in 
hope and as supplicants, desperate for a child, and relying on the agencies 
 
(g) A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not participate in making an 
aggregate settlement of the claims of or against the clients, or in a criminal case an 
aggregated agreement as to guilty or nolo contendere pleas, unless each client gives 
informed consent, in a writing signed by the client. The lawyer's disclosure shall in-
clude the existence and nature of all the claims or pleas involved and of the partici-
pation of each person in the settlement. 
(h) A lawyer shall not: 
(1) make an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer's liability to a client 
for malpractice unless the client is independently represented in making the 
agreement; or 
(2) settle a claim or potential claim for such liability with an unrepresented cli-
ent or former client unless that person is advised in writing of the desirability 
of seeking and is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independ-
ent legal counsel in connection therewith. 
(i) A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject 
matter of litigation the lawyer is conducting for a client, except that the lawyer may: 
(1) acquire a lien authorized by law to secure the lawyer's fee or expenses; and 
(2) contract with a client for a reasonable contingent fee in a civil case. 
(j) A lawyer shall not have sexual relations with a client unless a consensual sexual 
relationship existed between them when the client-lawyer relationship commenced. 
(k) While lawyers are associated in a firm, a prohibition in the foregoing paragraphs 
(a) through (i) that applies to any one of them shall apply to all of them. 
Id. See also Jedwabny v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 135 A.2d 252, 254 (Pa. 1957) (specifying 
what constitutes conflict of interest).   
 91 Stockton v. Ford, 52 U.S. 232, 247 (1850) (discussing nature of attorney client rela-
tionship) (internal citations omitted).  Other revered thinkers have commented on the na-
ture of the attorney-client relationship.  Sir Francis Bacon once said: 
 
THE greatest trust, between man and man, is the trust of giving counsel. . . . The 
wisest princes need not think it any diminution to their greatness, or derogation to 
their sufficiency, to rely upon counsel. God himself is not without, but hath made it 
one of the great names of his blessed Son: The Counsellor.   
 
Francis Bacon, Of Counsel, in THE ESSAYS OF FRANCIS BACON 181 (1846) available at 
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to help them become parents and depending on those agencies for their 
expertise and help.  Just as doctors, lawyers, and architects, the agencies 
are professionals who provide a window into a world that is unfamiliar to 
the parents who approach them.   
III.  The Right to Know in Adoption 
A.  Codes of Ethics in the Adoption Professions 
The right of informed consent forms part of the law applicable to 
the professions, but those professions are also governed by codes of eth-
ics.  AAdoption of and adherence to a code of ethics is the cornerstone of 
a profession and differentiates between professional and quasi- or semi-
professional practice.@92 If adoption agencies want to be viewed as pro-
fessionals, they need to adhere to the same principles that require that the 
surgeon advise against surgery where that surgery is unnecessary and the 
lawyer advise against legal action where that action would harm the cli-
ent.  Whether or not there is a code of ethics that requires such a result, 
the law imposes obligations that lead to similar results. 
Few social scientists have discussed the ethics applicable to adop-
tion agencies in placing children.  One such person is L. Anne Babb.93 
She points out that A[e]ethical inquiry has only been reflected in the pro-
 
http://www.authorama.com/essays-of-francis-bacon-21.html.
92 L. Anne Babb, Ethics in Contemporary American Adoption in CLINICAL AND 
PRACTICE ISSUES IN ADOPTION: BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN ADOPTEES PLACED AS INFANTS 
AND AS OLDER CHILDREN 117 (Victor Groza and Karen F. Rosenberg, eds., Praeger Publish-
ing 1998) (hereafter Babb Ethics). 
 93 Id. 
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fessional literature of psychology and social work for a scant 20 years.@94 
Some of the areas that have proved to be challenging 
for professionals at best, and problematic at worse, are 
conflict of interest, identifying the client, disclosure of in-
formation, responsibility to clients, and maintaining and 
improving professional competence.95 
One of the core difficulties identified in this article lies with the con-
flict of interest between the adoptive parents and the child.  As between 
those two entities, adoption agencies tended to view the child as the prior-
ity, leading to the result that A[m]any families felt . . .that they were per-
suaded [by social workers] to take . . . children against their better judg-
ment.@96 While this study refers largely to special needs adoptions, the 
disclosure principles applicable to such adoptions should equally apply in 
all adoptions.  It is the existence of risks that creates the duty of disclo-
sure, and if risks exist in all adoptions, all prospective parents should be 
informed of them.  Incidentally, it is possible that biological parents, 
when informed of the same risks, might decide not to place their children 
for adoption and subject them to Athe primal wound.@ It would be their 
right, just as it is the right of prospective adoptive parents to decide 
against adoption. 
The Babb Ethics study points out that there are five professions 
“commonly involved in adoption: social work, mental health, nursing, 
 
94 Id. at 117.  Of course, she is counting backward from 1998. 
 95 Id. 
96 Id. at 119. 
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law and medicine.”97 It is perhaps worth pointing out that law and medi-
cine have pre-existing obligations of informed consent and communica-
tion with clients, and thus do not need the additional impetus of further 
legally imposed rules as to disclosure.  Doctors and lawyers already owe 
duties to their patients and clients to inform them of risks.   
The “five professions share . . . ethical obligations” that include 
duties to clients, integrity, and communication.98 In terms of communica-
tion: 
This standard requires professionals to warn clients of 
adverse consequences of actions or services offered and 
asks professionals to tell clients about their rights, risks, 
opportunities, and obligations associated with profes-
sional service to them.  There was universal agreement 
that adoption clients should receive accurate and complete 
disclosure of information about adoption and the adverse 
consequences of adoption.99 
One of the problems with this standard in the context of adoption in-
volves deciding on the identity of the client: many respondents viewed 
the unborn child as the client in the context of infant adoption.  Others 
viewed the biological mother as the client, or the child and the biological 
mother as the client, while A45% considered the expectant parents, the 
unborn child, and the prospective adoptive parents [to be] the clients.@100 
The problem leaps from the page: the obligations to inform the adoptive 
parents about the general risks of adoption might lead them to abandon 
 
97 Id. at 123. 
 98 Id. 
99 Id. at 125. 
 100 Id. at 128. 
36 
the idea of adoption, which threatens the welfare of the baby and the bio-
logical mother.  This cannot justify failure to disclose, however.  Just as 
the donor of a kidney is entitled to know the risks to them of both the 
surgery and the long-term impact of having one kidney, even though it 
might lead to the proposed recipient losing the donation, so also the pro-
spective adoptive parents are entitled to know the long term risks of adop-
tion. 
The Babb Ethics study sets forth the following obligations to 
which adoption professionals should adhere: 
1.  The adoption professional should explain A[b]oth the positive 
and negative aspects of adoption for the adoptive parents and the adoptee. 
. .@101 
2.  AThe adoption professional should warn prospective adoptive 
parents about the possible adverse consequences of adoption. . . .The 
adoption professional should completely explain the possible long-term 
effects of separation, loss, and adoption to prospective adoptive parents, 
including the emotional and psychological effects of adoption for both the 
adoptee and the adoptive parents.@102 
3.  AThe adoption professional should provide written informa-
tion, recommended reading, counseling, and other resources to help adop-
tive parents understand adoption dynamics.@103 
101 Id. at 144. 
 102 Id. 
103 Id. 
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While states license adoption agencies, there is no uniform ethical 
code applicable to the profession and that would require the information 
outlined above.104 
B.  Legal Sources of Obligations to Inform in Adoption 
This article argues that there are legal obligations of duty and in-
formed consent that require that clients of adoption agencies receive in-
formation about adoption itself and the risks that it involves.  As was 
pointed out above, law and medicine already have legal obligations to 
disclose risks to their clients and patients.  These obligations spill over 
into the other professions involved, created by the nature of the relation-
ship and the presence of information that prospective parents need to 
know.  The duty to disclose is an affirmative way of viewing the obliga-
tion to share information; preventing fraud and misrepresentation is the 
negative.  If there is information in the possession of the adoption 
agencyBand this article shows that there isBthen withholding this informa-
tion both violates any duty to disclose and amounts to misrepresentation 
This article has demonstrated that there are studies that make it at 
least arguable that adopted children suffer from higher rates of learning, 
emotional, and mental health problems than nonadopted children.  One of 
the major and glaring omissions from the literature is evidence that would 
scientifically explain why the risks are there.  There are several possible 
explanations for the undeniably higher rates of learning disabilities and 
 
104 Id. at 132. 
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mental illness in the adopted population than in the nonadopted popula-
tion.  The explanations include the following: 
1.  That fact that one is adopted is itself a source of trauma and a 
reality that can produce serious problems as the child reaches adoles-
cence.  This possibility cuts across all adoptions, no matter the age or 
background of the child. 
2.  Most if not all forms of mental illness and learning disability 
have a genetic base.  For some reason as yet not fully understood or stud-
ied, adopted children have higher genetic risk factors for learning dis-
abilities and mental illness.  These risks inevitably cause the school and 
social problems from which adopted children seem to suffer at a higher 
rate than the nonadopted population. 
3.  Adopted children have higher genetic risks for learning dis-
abilities, and adoption itself is a source of trauma.  These two factors, 
acting together, produce the higher rates of learning disabilities and men-
tal illness that studies have found in adopted populations. 
It is noteworthy that none of these three explanations has any-
thing to do with specific risk factors for the particular child.  It is clear 
that an adoption agency has an obligation to disclose any information that 
it has or should have relating to the individual child; if it does not, it has 
committed the tort of wrongful adoption and is subject to suit.  But adop-
tion itself seems to bring with it ineluctable risks to all children and sepa-
rate and apart from individuated risks to the particular child.  In the medi-
cal arena, doctors are obligated to disclose the risks of medical proce-
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dures so that their patients can make informed decisions about what 
treatment to undergo.  In the legal arena, lawyers have an ethical obliga-
tion to inform their clients of pertinent risks so that their clients can make 
important decisions such as whether to settle a case, testify, or plead 
guilty.  As yet, adoption agencies have not been held to a standard that 
would require that they inform all prospective adoptive parents of the 
issues that may well be in their future. 
Whatever the source of problems in adopted children, adoptive 
parents should be informed that adopted children demonstrably have a 
much higher level of learning and mental health problems than 
nonadopted children.  Most adoptive parents greet their new child with 
joy and with a complete ignorance of the future problems they are likely 
to confront.  Agencies, who have no excuse for not knowing the risks, are 
clearly the best entities to prepare the new parents for their future crises.  
If the information deters some parents, they probably should not be 
adopting in the first place.  In any event, adoptive parents need to know 
that love is not enough and that the problems that their child may develop 
probably had nothing to do with their parenting.  The seeds have already 
been sown.  But knowing what is coming will help both the child and the 
parents, and may actually help to minimize the damage. 
When a couple goes to a genetics counselor prior to becoming 
pregnant, the counselor has an obligation to inform them of any and all 
risks that that might be material in their decision making process.  An 
obstetrician has an obligation to disclose not only risks of the specific 
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pregnancy, but also more general risks, for example if the mother is over 
a certain age.  The important watchword here is disclosure. 
Similarly, when a couple goes to an adoption agency seeking to 
adopt, they are of course entitled to any child-specific information.  But 
they are also entitled to any and all information about general risks, such 
as the risks discussed in this article.  The agency should have a legal ob-
ligation to disclose all information that the agency knows or should know 
about the general risks of adoption.  This obligation is underlined and 
informed by the fact that the majority of prospective adoptive parents has 
come through the despair of infertility and are particularly apt to discount 
or ignore any negative information they receive.  Prospective adoptive 
parents are a vulnerable group; adoption professionals should not trade on 
this vulnerability. 
 If the information is equivocal, as much of it is, the prospective 
couple should receive such information; the impact (if any) on their adop-
tion plans is up to them, it is not up to the agency to decide.  If this in-
formation is not available because its generation has been eschewed by 
the entities most able to discover it, that in itself is something of a warn-
ing flag and should be disclosed.  The agency must adhere to a duty to the 
couple, as well as to the child, and not seek to place a child with a couple 
that--through ignorance--is ill-equipped to deal with the problems and 
crises that may, or may not, lie ahead.  
 
